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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this paper is to highlight the determinants of informal sector activity with a special 
focus on informal self-employment opposed to informal wage employment. For this purpose we build a 
theoretical framework to show the important role of education in occupational choice. To empirically test 
our hypothesis, we estimate a two-stage degenerated nested Logit model after rejecting the IIA hypothesis. 
Our results show that the probability of formal sector employment increases with the level of education. 
In the informal sector education attainment tends to reduce the probability of self-employment as 
opposed to wage employment. Other relevant determinants are related to gender, age and place of 
residence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The general objective of this paper is to revisit the determinants of informal sector activity in Burkina 
Faso. The paper specifically seeks to investigate the drivers of informal self-employment relative to formal 
and informal wage employment. Since one would expect education and the basic understanding of the 
way the economy functions to affect people’s decision to enter one sector or another, the paper first 
develops a simple theoretical model to shed light on that potential link. Then, using household survey data 
from Burkina Faso for 2007 it empirically assess the impact of various factors on the probabilities for 
three employment options: formal sector wage employment, informal sector self-employment and 
informal sector wage employment. The probabilities are estimated using a two-stage degenerated nested 
logit model after rejecting the IIA1 hypothesis. 
  
The results show that education positively impacts the likelihood of wage employment whether in the 
formal or in the informal sector of the economy in Burkina Faso. Likewise, education increases the 
probability of formal sector employment over informal sector employment. Findings also show that some 
other factors do not play a clear role in driving people into the formal sector of the economy. Those 
include place of residence, access to credit, access to drinking water and to phone lines. The results also 
show that even in the informal sector men are still more likely to land job offers than women. 
 
The concept of informal sector finds its origins back in the 1970s with the emergence of heterogeneous 
good and service production activities out of the usual framework of the economy (BIT, 1970; Keith Hart, 
1972).Since then the concept of informal economy is sparking off interesting debates on its definition, 
determinants and links with formal economy, job creation and economic growth. If there is a consensus 
on the difference between informal activities and “prohibited” activities, some authors still argue that the 
development of informality is due to the will to escape from heavy taxes and regulations (Loayza, 1996; 
Loayza and al., 2006). According to Botero and al (2003), the regulation of labor market through a 
minimum wage for example prevents the economy from using all the available labor. Thus, the 
unemployed are obliged to take refuge in the informal sector.  
 
The evolution of the informal sector in developing countries is intimately related to the socioeconomic 
crisis of 1970s and the following Structural Adjustment Programs (Roubaud and Seruzier, 1991). In fact, 
most governments in developing countries had to reduce the supply of public jobs as part of their strategy 
to reduce budget deficits. Moreover, privatizations shifted the burden to occupy a growing workforce to 
an embryonic private sector. The failing public and private sectors, and the seasonality of rural activities 
led to the emergence of a new type of activities called “survival activities” generating incomes even in 
urban areas. That explains the reference to the informal sector as a low productive one deemed to 
disappear as the economy develops (Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
                                                          
1Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
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However, over the last decade, the informal sector has shown persistence in Sub-Saharan economies and 
positioned itself as an alternative source of income and professional insertion. The informal sector stands 
as the second source of job creation behind the rural sector by occupying more than 70% of the non-farm 
workforce and by contributing about 42% to the GDP of these economies2. In Burkina Faso, the 
unstructured economy3 represents 25% of the country’s GDP and occupies about 70% of the non-farm 
workforce4. Moreover the 1-2-3 survey carried out in Ouagadougou (city capital of Burkina Faso) has 
highlighted that only 9.3% of informal sector entrepreneurs have chosen this activity because they did not 
find a job in the formal sector. However, most of the informal sector’s actors consider informal self-
employment as a best way for professional insertion. In fact as pointed out by Günther and Launov 
(2006), depending on their characteristics, some individuals may have a comparative advantage to work in 
the informal sector. According to the same survey informal self-employment represented 72.2% of 
informal units in 2001 and more than 81.5% of new jobs created in the informal sector from 1990 to 
2000. However over the last decade self-employment represented only 52% of new jobs in this sector. 
Thus, the unstructured economy progressively reveals his capacity to hire new labor under salaried status. 
 
These facts point to the need to revisit the factors that drive people into the informal sector. While 
informal self-employment used to be dominant, the informal sector is increasingly offering wage 
employment opportunities. Thus, shedding light into the dynamics of the informal sector requires that one 
first understands the determinants of informal self-employment. The picture can then be complemented 
with an investigation of the intrinsic, economic and social characteristics leading or constraining people to 
informal self-employment. The answer to those questions can contribute to rationalize the persistence of 
informal activities and enlighten policies aimed at addressing the issue of informality. In fact, the basic 
statistics computed with the data base show that the average monthly earning for the formal salaried 
employees is 81,071.01 FCFA against 44,424.53 FCFA for the informal wage earners and 43,000 FCFA 
for the self-employed. From these differences it is puzzling that the majority of the informal sector actors 
would declare their strong preference for the informal sector as revealed by the 1-2-3 survey in 
Ouagadougou. 
 
Several studies on the labor market of Developed countries have pointed to individual socioeconomic 
characteristics, business environment, and government policies as the main determinants of self-
employment (Rees and Shah 1986; Bernhardt 1994; Millàn and al, 2010). Some authors as Yamada (1996), 
Combarnous (1999), find similar results for sub-Saharan Africa after distinguishing informal and formal 
sectors.  
 
                                                          
2 International Labor Organisation (ILO) : 12th African Regional Meeting ; Johannesburg, South Africa, October 11-14 2011 
3 According to the ISND (the National Agency of Statistics in Burkina Faso), the informal sector refers to all the units of 
production without a fiscal identification number and/or which do not keep written books  
4 INSD (2003) 
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Studies of the determinants of informality in Burkina Faso are typically limited to the few major cities 
(Ouagadougou, Bobo-Dioulasso and Koudougou). This paper uses the annual survey of households’ 
standards of living 2007 which is a recent database covering the whole country of Burkina Faso. Thus this 
paper goes deeper in featuring the particularities of informal activities (non-agricultural) in rural areas and 
adds to the understanding of informality trends in Burkina Faso. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a literature review. The second section 
develops a theoretical framework around the role of education in choosing one sector of activity or 
another. Section 3 presents the database used in our empirical analysis as well as the variables used in our 
estimation model. Section 4 presents estimation results along with the related discussion. The last section 
concludes. 
 
Section 1: Literature Review 
 
Standard models of occupational choice based on individual rationality argue that the choice between self-
employment (formal or informal) and formal wage employment depends on the difference of utility 
between these two statuses. Then an individual would choose informal or formal self-employment if the 
expected utility, most of time measured by the expected income, exceeds the utility from formal wage 
employment (Yamada, 1996; Rees and Shah, 1986; Bernhardt, 1994; Johansson, 2000; Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2006). However, some authors as have found that the difference in expected incomes may 
not be a significant factor in some instances (see, e.g. El Aynaoui, 1997 in Morocco). El Aynaoui (1997) 
emphasizes intrinsic characteristics as gender, age, education and extrinsic characteristics such as familial 
and economic environments. Do and Duchene (2008) also show that women in Vietnam have to rely on 
self-employment mainly in the informal sector despite the attractiveness of formal salary jobs. 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), relatively low levels of women’s education and social norms often limit 
women to unpaid domestic cleaning work. For example according to the 1-2-3 survey in WAEMU5 
capitals, 64% of women did not complete primary school compared to45% for men (Kuepie, Nordman 
and Roubaud, 2009). In those conditions, engaging into small income-generating activities at home or on 
streets remains entry point into the labor market. In Ouagadougou, women represent about 47% of 
informal self-employed in catering and retail trade from which they derive the most precarious incomes 
(INSD, 2003). This contrasts with the case of well-educated women who are likely to be wage-earner in 
the formal sector (Kabubo-Mariara, 2003). However, Hammouda and Lassassi (2011) find that women 
who attended vocational school are still likely to be self-employed in the informal sector. These results 
suggest an ambiguous role for human capital in the occupational choice of individuals, including women, 
men and the young alike. 
                                                          
5 West African Economic and Monetary Union 
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With regard to the role of education in occupational choices two main strands emerge from studies of the 
labor market in developed countries where the distinction between informal and formal sector have been 
overlooked. The first one holds that a high level of education favors self-employment (Le 1999, Rees and 
Shah, 1986; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Borjas and Bronars, 1989; Blanchflower, 2000; Congregado and al, 
2009). Education may be a good channel to acquire managerial skills to choose entrepreneurship. 
However, Casson (2003) questions this idea and claims that formal education is not a panacea for sound 
managerial skills. Thus the second theoretical strand which suggests that higher level education increases 
the chance of wage employment in the less risky formal sector (Le, 1999; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; 
Kidd, 1993; Taylor, 2001; Destré and Henrard, 2004). 
 
Results from many studies of the informal sector in SSA lend support to the second strand above (House 
et al, 1993; Taylor, 1996; Rankin, Sandefur and Teal, 2010). In fact, in most West African cities the formal 
sector (public and private) values education (Kuepie, Nordman and Roubaud, 2009) by providing social 
protection and a better access to financial services. In contrary less educated people are more likely to be 
self-employed or wage-earners in the informal sector since the alternative to create a formal firm involve 
some financial and administrative cost many of them cannot bear. Cogneau (2001) and Zerbo (2006) point 
to job rationing in the formal sector as an important factor that limits the absorption capacity of the 
structured economy for qualified labor. This explains the increasing number of young graduates working 
in the informal sector.  
 
Moreover, education increases the chances of getting better paid positions in the formal sector (Kuepie, 
Nordman and Roubaud, 2009; Nguetse Tegoum, 2009). This contrasts with the case of uneducated young 
individuals who are more likely to be unpaid workers as apprentices or family-aids. For those young 
individuals there are therefore many barriers to the labor market. Limited by their low level of education 
or their lack of experience most of them are relegated to the informal sector although their hope is for a 
better job in the structured economy (Zerbo, 2006; House and al, 1993).  
 
Similarly, family background as including marital status, household size and parental occupation impacts 
occupational choice and the risk of informality. Rees and Shah (1986) analyze that married individuals 
mentally supported by their family are more likely to take risk by electing for self-employment. However, 
Dolton and Make (1990) consider that the same family background can bring about risk aversion because 
of family responsibilities. Zerbo (2006) argues that when the household relies only on the head’s income 
to meet end needs any negative shock to his work conditions (e.g. decrease of income) can lead family 
members to consider income generating activities generally in the informal sector, regardless of how 
precarious those activities may be. In such instances, household size and the expansion of the informal 
sector are positively correlated. However, El Aynaoui (1997) and Njikam and al (2005) respectively find 
that in the case of Morocco and Cameroon individuals whose parents work in the formal sector are more 
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likely to get a job in the formal sector as well whereas those whose parents are in the informal sector are 
more likely to seek opportunities in the informal sector.  
 
External factors to individuals such as place of residence (rural or urban), the economic and institutional 
environments also play a role in the occupational choice. With regard to the place of residence, we must 
recognize that informal activities are originally an urban phenomenon. The availability of infrastructure 
and the demand for services and consumption goods in urban areas increases the probability of self-
employment or informal sector employment for those living in those areas. However informal activities 
relating to trade, transportation, manufacturing have lately been expanding in the rural areas as well. These 
activities represent an opportunity to diversify the sources of household income and are consistent with 
the dynamics of countryside development. 
 
With regards to individuals’ economic environment this refers to physical and financial endowment. It is 
well known that entry into the formal sector is conditional on some level of education whereas informal 
sector is generally characterized by its open access. However starting an informal business may require a 
minimum level of investment capital (Jütting and al, 2008). The level of available capital in turns 
determines the type and the branch of activities one can enter in. Most employers or self-employed are 
also better endowed with physical and financial capital compared to wage workers. Therefore, liquidity 
constraints to self-employment in either the formal or the informal sector do exist (Congregado and al, 
2009). Available evidence from Burkina Faso shows that most informal actors derive their capital from 
personal savings, inheritance and family donations (INSD, 2003). 
 
The business cycle may also play a role regarding informal sector activity. Zerbo (2006) shows that during 
recessions the supply of formal jobs decreases and more people have to earn a living in the informal 
sector. Loayza and Rigolini (2006) also find evidence of a counter-cyclical informal sector. However, Fiess, 
Fugazza and Maloney (2010) document episodes of pro-cyclical informal employment in Latin America 
countries, especially when driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the non-tradable sector.  
 
Also important in understanding occupational choices is the institutional context, i.e. labor market 
regulation, intellectual property rights and the business environment. Many authors, including Maloney 
(2004), Oviedo (2008), Ingram and al. (2007), DCED (2009) and Andrews and al. (2011) analyze that entry 
into the informal sector is based on a cost/benefit analysis. An individual would choose informal sector if 
the expected benefit exceeds the net benefit of activity in the formal sector. The benefits of informality 
include not only the expected income but also tax avoidance, autonomy, and greater flexibility in terms of 
working hours which sometimes proves useful for women often constrained by social norms (World 
Bank, 2004; Jütting and al, 2008). The costs involve non access to public infrastructure (electricity, 
telecommunication), limited access to formal financial market, lack of social protection (social security, 
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insurance), and lack of formal contracts which leads to occupational hazards, long working hours and 
uncertainty of future earnings (Jütting and al, 2008). 
 
However other authors argue that the cost/benefit analysis requires perfect information and skills that the 
majority of informal workers do not have (DCED, 2009; Jütting and al, 2008). Available evidence shows 
that 60% to 80% of own-account workers in Ouagadougou don’t know how to register their activity 
whereas only 1% to 3% consider the process is heavy and expensive (INSD, 2003). Thus, entry into the 
informal sector is not necessarily voluntary as implied by the cost/benefit approach. 
 
Whereas the cost/benefit perspective assumes that individuals make informed decisions to enter the 
informal sector, the empowerment approach posits that governance failure is the main cause of exclusion 
from the structured economy, especially for the poor (Perry and al, 2007).Unequal access to basic social 
services like education and health translates into differentiated access to formal labor markets. Initially low 
capabilities combine with limited access to social and judicial services and lack of economic opportunities 
to restrict the poor to the informal sector. Thus the empowerment approach points to the fact 
engagement in the informal sector is beyond people’s control (i.e. not voluntary) and seems to be more in 
line with the realities of Sub-Saharan Africa where significant disparities in access to public services and 
opportunities exist between agents from the informal and formal sector of the economy. 
 
Section 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
Consider a small closed economy with perfectly competitive markets and two sectors of activity: formal 
(F) and informal (I). Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor which they inelastically supply in the 
labor market, whether formal or informal. We assume a more productive technology relative to the 
informal sector. This may be because of a better access to infrastructure and financial markets. In other 
words the total factor productivity is higher in the formal sector compared to the informal one. 
 
A- Production 
Production of goods and services in the formal sector is given by a neo-classical production function6: 
                 with                                                                                                             (1) 
   : Total production of goods and services in the formal sector 
  human capital (quantity and quality of labor) used in the formal sector 
  physical capital used in the formal sector 
  Total factor productivity (global productivity of factors) in the formal sector 
 
                                                          
6 F(.) at least  twicely differentiable; ii) strictly decreasing partial derivatives; iii) concavity ; iv) constant returns to scale ; v) 
INADA conditions 
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In the short term, physical capital is fixed. Letting       then equation (1) becomes: 
                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
At the competitive equilibrium of the economy the marginal productivity of human capital is equal to the 
real wage rate7: 
   
                                                                                                                                             (3) 
Production in the informal sector is also given by a similar neo-classical function: 
                                                                                                                                                 (4) 
   Total production of goods and services in the informal sector 
  human capital (quantity and quality of labor) used in the informal sector 
 :physical capital used in the informal sector 
   Total factor productivity (global productivity of factors) in the informal sector 
As the formal sector is more productive technology relative to the informal sector then     
In the short term, physical capital is considered fixed so         and relation (4) becomes: 
                                                                                                                                                   (5) 
At the competitive equilibrium of the economy the marginal productivity of human capital is equal to real 
wage rate: 
   
                                                                                                                                                (6) 
Thus human capital receives a higher wage in the formal sector. In fact, 
       
        
         because      so                                                           (7) 
In other words, due to technology differences qualified individuals receive higher wages in the formal 
sector compared to the informal one. For simplicity we assume that wages in the formal sector capture all 
other benefits from formal employment including social security contributions (family allowance, pension, 
insurance…) 
 
B- Consumption 
Consider an individual   whose labor income is mainly allocated to consumption of goods and services. If 
  is employed in the formal sector his utility is as follows: 
  
              
                                                                                                                            (8) 
   : level of education (proxy of human capital) 
   : intrinsic and familial characteristics ( gender, age, marital status, household size) 
  
  : gross income ofindividual  in the formal sector 
Similarly if   is employed in the informal sector his utility is written as: 
  
              
                                                                                                                              (9) 
So the utility of agent   in the whole economy can be expressed like: 
                                                          
7    is a function at least twicely differentiable. In this paper 
  
  
  is noted   and 
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                                                                                                                                            (10) 
With 
               8                                                                                                                         (11) 
 
 
 
It is possible to group together the workers in different occupational classes ranked according to the 
importance of incomes and benefits related to each class. For example in the formal sector on can 
distinguish employers, wage earners, interns and sector, employers, own-account workers, wage earners, 
apprentices and family-aids in the informal. 
 
  is a variable that represents the different occupational groups(professional categories) in the labor 
market. As   increases individual   moves toward the formal sector with higher wages and benefits. On 
the other hand, when   decreases individual   moves toward informality with growing vulnerability and 
precariousness. Hence: 
 
                                                                                                                                                     (12) 
 
Intuitively, for a given level of education and other socioeconomic characteristics, if the consumer is 
already in a formal occupational class providing consistent incomes and social advantages, the marginal 
utility for reaching a better class should be declining. Thus the following assumption: 
The marginal utility of   is declining                                                                                 (13) 
However, as the level of education increases, the chances to access a better occupational class in the 
formal sector increases as well. Therefore, the marginal utility associated with the progression toward 
these better classes may tend to increase. Thus the following assumption: 
The marginal utility of   is increasing in the level of education                                  (14) 
 
Under the assumption of rational individuals, as the level of education increases and given intrinsic and 
familial characteristics, a consumer should prefer the occupational class that maximizes his utility subject 
to the constraint of entry costs into the formal sector. That is expressed by the following maximization 
program: 
 
                                                                                                                                             (15) 
 
            
 
                                                          
8We follow Mbaye and Benjamin (2012) who depart from the traditional formal vs. informal distinction and develop an approach 
to informality in continuous terms. 
 
 
       Informal      Formal 
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  is the for entry in the formal sector cost function9.It captures all the costs pertaining to the search of 
information and administrative process necessary to land a formal sector job for example. Those costs are 
increasing in . Thus: 
                                                                                                                                                 (16) 
 
Moreover individuals with a higher education level may have a comparative advantage relative to 
unqualified individuals in their job search. For instance they may have better ability to use ICT10, to draft a 
CV and hold a job interview. So we assume that the entry cost to formal sector decreases as the level of 
education increases: 
                                                                                                                                                (17) 
Also, we assume that: 
- The marginal cost to enter in the formal sector increases with the occupational class 
                                                                                                                                                (18) 
- The marginal cost to enter in the formal sector decreases with the level of education 
                                                                                                                                                (19) 
 
  : represents the maximum wealth or assets that a consumer can allocate to the job search. 
The Lagrangian associated to program (15) can be written as: 
                           with                                                                           (20) 
The first order conditions imply that. 
                                                                                                              (21) 
Next, consider   function     defined as:                                          (22) 
 
According to the Implicit Functions Theorem, if                then there exists a function,     
such that           and   
  
  
  
  
  
                                      (23) 
                        and since      and       according to (14) and (19) 
It follows that                              (24) 
In application of the Implicit Functions Theorem:   
  
  
  
  
  
 and since 
                        with      and        so                                       (25) 
 
It follows that:
  
  
                                                                                                       (26) 
 
Proposition1: (Interpretation) The more educated an individual, the higher the occupational category 
which he aims to in the formal sector. This is because higher-ranked occupational categories imply higher 
labor income, and thus, utility, on average.  
 
The above theoretical result underlies the hypothesis to be tested empirically in the next section: 
                                                          
9 The function        
   
  
 with         is an example of function meeting the assumptions (16) (17) (18) and (19) 
10Information and Communication Technology 
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  : The probability to work in the formal sector increases with the level of education. 
In other words a low level of education increases the probability to work in the informal sector. 
 
Section 3: Empirical Framework 
 
The annual households’ standards of livingsurvey2007 group together the non-agricultural workforce in 
five (5) social and occupational classes11: Wage earners of the public sector, wage earners of the private 
(structured) sector, employers or own-account workers of the informal sector, the salaried of the informal 
sector and family-aids or apprentices. Since the goal of this paper focuses on informality, we restructure 
those classes into 3: 
i) The salaried of formal sector: wage earners of public and private sector 
ii) The employers and own-account workers of the informal sector: informal self-employment 
iii) The salaried of informal sector 
 
Family-aids and apprentices who receive no money are combined with non-workers in a group called “the 
non-paid workers”. According to relation (11)   can be defined as: 
    
 
 
 
 
  
 
Thus the factors that take a working age individual into one of these 4 situations can be estimated using a 
multinomial logit model. The utility associated to class   is assumed to be linear in a vector of observable 
characteristics of the individual   as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                 (27)                                                                                                      
    : vector of observable characteristics of the individual   
   :  vector of parameters to be estimated 
    : error term 
The characteristics of individual   pertain mainly to his level of education, age, gender, familial background 
and the earnings derived from his occupational category. 
The first issue we are faced with is that the earnings are observed only if the occupational class is chosen. 
So there is a potential risk of endogeneity bias relative to observed earnings. To cope with that issue we 
estimate the earnings equation of each category in order to predict the associated expected incomes. Then 
these expected earnings will be included in a second step as explanatory variables. 
 
The selection bias associated with the estimation of the earnings equation stems from the fact that 
income-earners are only observed when they work buy not everybody works or receives compensation 
                                                          
11 According to the database used the formal self-employment represents only 0.2% of the workforce; So this negligible group has 
been excluded of our analysis 
Non-paid workers 
Salaried of informal sector 
Informal self-employment 
Salaried of formal sector 
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when they do. Also wage-earners may have a comparative advantage or some unobserved attributes that 
pre-select them into formal wage employment or informal jobs (Roy, 1951). To address the selection bias 
issue we use the Heckman’s two-step procedure generalized by Lee (1983) for the multinomial logit case 
(see in Appendix). At the first stage the multinomial logit model is used to compute the correction terms 
   from the predicted probabilitiesfor individual   to be in category  . The     (generalized forms of the 
inverse Mill’s ratios) are then introduced into the earnings equation for each professional category, , as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                               (28) 
 
   : logarithm of the monthly income provided by professional category   
  : vector of observable elements of human capital (education12, age) and family environment 
   : mean-independent of the regressors 
   : correlation parameter between the errors terms of earnings and the one of each class 
 
Lee’s method has been criticized for relying on a strong assumption for the joint distribution of error 
terms (Schmertmann, 1994; Dahl, 2002; Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand, 2007). However, given the 
small size of our sub-samples we prefer Lee’s method than Dubin and McFadden’s or Dahl’s method. In 
fact, based on Monte-Carlo simulations, Bourguignon and al. (2007) conclude that ‘‘Lee’s method is 
adapted to very small samples ”.  
 
Another potential problem is that the multinomial logit may suffer from the violation of the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA). According to Bourguignon, Fournier and 
Gurgand (2007) “when the focus is on estimating an outcome over selected populations rather than on 
estimating the selection process itself the multinomial logit is consistent even in case of violation of IIA”. 
But our ultimate objective is to shed light on the factors that select individuals into each occupational class 
and predicted earnings maybe one of the relevant factors. Based on our interest for the selection process 
itself we have performed the Hausman test and found evidence that the IIA assumption was violated (see 
Table 11 in Appendix).  
 
Next, we use a degenerated nested logit which relaxes the IIA assumption. Its computation was facilitated by 
the fact that the different occupational choices in the labor market can be represented by the following 
tree structure: 
                                                          
12Several authors have shown that education can be endogenous when estimating an earnings equation and use instrumental 
variables relative to parental education and occupation, distance to the closest school…are used. Since our analysis already focuses 
on heads of households it is difficult to find relevant instrumental variables for education. 
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The above representation allows us to highlight at the first level the relevant determinants of self-
employment compared to the informal wage employment. At the second level, the factors affecting the 
probability to work in the formal sector compared to the informal one will be pointed out. 
 
Level 1:      
 
 
  
 
 
Level 2:     
 
 
  
 
 
A- Definition of variables  
 
We define some binary dependent variables as follows: 
Level 1 - the “self-employment” variable (S_empl):  
         
                                       
                                     
  
 
 
Level 2 - the “Job” variable: 
 
      
                                
                                 
  
 
The explanatory variables used at the 2nd level of our model are: 
 
i) Intrinsic characteristics, family background and place of residence 
The Gender variable for the household head is equal to 1 when the head is a man and 0 otherwise. The 
age of the head is stratified in 4 dummies variables: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-64. The reference variable 
is the age bracket 45-64. This stratification allows us to measure the impact of the different generations. 
The marital status of the head is equal to 1 if married and 0 otherwise. There are also household size and 
level of education13. The level of education is stratified in 4 dummies modalities: No education, 1-6 years 
                                                          
13Vocational training is not included in the analysis because of the lack of consistent data on this aspect of education  
Non-farm workers 
Informal Formal 
        Self-employment Informal wage employment Formal wage employment 
Level 2 
Level 1 
Self-employment 
Informal wage employment 
Formal sector 
Informal sector 
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of schooling (Primary school), 7-14 (Secondary school) and more than 14 years (+14, high education). The 
dummy variable No education is the variable of reference. Finally, the variable ‘’place of residence’’ takes 
the value 1 if the household head lives in urban area and 0 otherwise. 
 
ii) Expected Earnings and branch of activities 
 
The expected earnings refer, to the predicted earnings based on the earnings equation of each 
occupational option. There are noted E_Wfwe for formal wage employment; E_Wiwe for informal wage 
employment and E_Wse for self-employment. To minimize the risk of colinearity, we use the interactions 
between the expected earnings and the level of education (see Tables 6 and 8 in Appendix). The branches 
of activities are represented by the following dummies: Industries, Tradable Services, Non Tradable 
Services, and Financial Services14. The variable of reference is Financial Services. 
 
iii) Access to public services, financing services and social protection 
 
The variable “Possession of fixed phone line” delivered by the National Telecommunication Agency is 
equal to 1 if the head of the household has a phone line and 0 if not. The other variable is “Access to 
electricity” which is equal to 1 if the head of household has access to electricity delivered by the National 
Electricity Agency and 0 otherwise. The variable “Access to drinking water”15delivered by the National 
Water Agency is equal to 1 if the head of the household has access to drinking water and 0 otherwise. 
 
The dummy variable “Access to credit” is equal to 1 if the head of the household has applied and 
obtained a credit and 0 otherwise. Variables relative to social protection are: the “Right to old-age 
pension” equals to 1 if the head of the household benefits from this right and 0 otherwise; and the “Right 
to paid leave” equal to 1 if the head of the household benefits from this right and 0 otherwise. 
 
B- Descriptive statistics 
 
We use the household standards of living annual survey for 2007 in Burkina Faso. The database provides 
demographic and socioeconomic information on a representative sample of 8,500 households across the 
country. Our focus on the non-farm workforce reduces the database to 2,513household heads, including 
86.3% of men and 13.7% of women.About29.6% of the household heads are wage workers in the formal 
sector; 10.5% of them are wage workers in the informal sector whereas self-employed represent 59.9%. 
 
                                                          
14Industries refer mainly to manufacturing, mining, and building. Tradable Services refer to trade, repairing, and transportation. 
Non Tradable Services refer to public administration, education and health. 
15This variable includes the individual line, the shared lines and the public drinking fountains 
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As shown in Table 1 in the Appendix, men are strongly predominant in all 3 occupational classes whereas 
women are mostly Self-employed. In fact women represent 18.6% of the self-employed but only 8.5% of 
formal wage earners and 0.4% of informal wage earners. There are also strong disparities in education. In 
fact, about 66.3 % of self-employed have no education compared to 35.1 % of informal sector workers 
and only 7% of formal sector’s wage earners. 
 
Workers with a higher level of education (more than 14 years of schooling) represent 23.6% of wage 
workers in the formal sector, 7.2 % of wage workers in the informal sector and only 1.8 % of self-
employed. Those figures suggest that high level of education increases the probability of work in the 
formal sector. In the informal sector educated workers seem to prefer a salaried status at the expense of 
self-employment. With regard to the place of residence, wage earners from both the formal and informal 
sectors are more likely to live in urban areas. About 88.7 % of wage earners of the informal sector live in 
urban areas. Most of the employers in the informal sector also live in urban areas. The distribution of 
workers and employers across regions thus seems to be driven by the urban bias of national development 
strategies as urban areas provide the best business opportunities due to available public infrastructure and 
consumption goods and services. 
The average monthly wage income for formal sector’s workers is 81,071.01 FCFA compared to 44,424.53 
FCFA in the informal sector and 43,000 FCFA for the self-employed. However, there are strong 
inequalities within each occupational group. In fact, half of the salaried employees in formal sector earn 
less than 60,000 FCFA per month compared to 30,000 FCFA for the informal wage earners and 30,500 
FCFA for the self-employed.  
 
Regarding access to public services, only 3.7% of self-employed people have a fixed phone line compared 
to 6.8% of informal wage earners and about 20.1% of the formal wage earners. About 77.4% of the 
formal wage earners have access to electricity compared to 53.2 % of the informal wage earners and only 
31.3% of the informal salaried. The informal salaried are also disadvantaged in terms of access to drinking 
water. These disparities stem from the fact that almost of the wage earners both formal and informal live 
in urban areas where there is a better provision of public services. 
 
There are also strong inequalities in access to social protection between the different occupational 
categories. In fact, about 91% of the formal wage earners benefit from an old-age pension opposed 
to7.5% of informal salaried and 2.3% of the self-employed. Likewise, only 2.3% of the latter can claim 
paid leaves against 19.2% in the informal sector and 93.9% of the salaried in the formal sector.  
 
Regarding access to financial services, in 200741% of the formal wage earners have applied for a credit 
compared to 7.5% of salaried from the informal sector and 13% of the self-employed. The data show that 
almost all applicants received were granted a loan regardless of their occupational class.  
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Section 4: Results and discussion 
 
A- The earnings equation 
 
Abstracting away from Lee’s selection term in the estimation equation, we find that the level of education, 
the size of the household and urban residency positively and significantly affect (at 1% level of 
significance) the earning profile of the self-employed. Age and marital status have no significant effect 
whereas the gender variable is significant (at 10%).  
 
With the selection term we find the same relevant variables but with higher returns. In fact, the return to 
primary education (1-6 years of schooling) for self-employed is 13.15% compared to 38.48% for the 
secondary education and 99.18% for higher education. This suggests a convex return to education for self-
employed people. The results are in line with the conclusions of Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2010) for 
Ghana and Tanzania. Kuepie and al (2009) and NguetseTegoum (2009) find similar results for 6 capitals 
of WAEMU and Cameroon respectively.  
 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that gender has an impact on self-employment income. Being a 
man increases earnings by 11.5% as compared to being a woman. Clearly, men earn more out of self-
employment relative to women. In fact, according to the results above, the level of education increases the 
earnings in the self-employment category. And yet the education attainment of women is low as opposed 
to men. So this difference of qualifications may explain the earnings gap between men and women. 
Moreover the women are confined in less productive activities (retail, catering) whereas men are more 
likely to work in the high productive one (manufacturing). Likewise, living in urban area enhances the 
earning profile by a factor of 44.9% compared to rural area. The coefficient on the correction-selection 
terms in the equation is negative (but not significant). This result suggests that the unobservable 
characteristics that select people into self-employment do not impact their earning profile.  
 
With regard to the earning equation for wage employment in the informal sector, the Lee selection term is 
positive but only significant at 10%.That suggests those selected into wage employment in the informal 
sector have some unobservable characteristics that make them more suitable for this employment status 
compared to the other workers. Those characteristics can be related to their low reservation wages or 
attributes like resourcefulness. In fact, it has been shown in the descriptive statistics that informal wage 
earners are relatively more educated than the self-employed. According to the same statistics the formal 
sector provides the highest earnings. So one can assume that the informal wage earners after failing to get 
a job in the formal sector, accept lower wages in the informal sector.  
Age, household size, marital status and primary school education are not significant determinants of 
earning profiles. In contrast, the return to 7-14 years of schooling is about 39.52% and 76.01% for higher 
education. Thus there is also some evidence that returns to education are convex for informal wage 
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employment. Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2010) find similar results for Ghana although their results for 
Tanzania differ. Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that gender matters in this sub-sector as 
well, since being a man increases the earnings to 190% compared to being a woman16. This result suggests 
that even in the informal sector men are still more likely to land an offer than women. The main reason of 
this finding may be the weakness of women’s education relatively to men. Also, living in urban area 
enhances the incomes to 71.41% compared to urban area. In fact the urban area contrary to rural area 
provides better infrastructure and a higher consumption demand that stimulates the production. So more 
productive and more competitive the urban informal sector may provide higher ages than the rural one. 
 
Without Lee selection term the returns to education are convex for wage income in the formal sector. 
Except for the household size which is significant at 10% all other variables are insignificant. 
However, including the correction-selection term in the estimation equation suggests negative and 
significant (at 1%) returns to education, regardless of the level of education. The unobservable 
characteristics that select people into the formal sector seem to also affect their incomes negatively in that 
sector. These results align with Rankin,Sandefur and Teal (2010) for Tanzania, but contrast with Kuepie 
and al (2009) and NguetseTegoum (2009).  
 
Reason for the above results may be that in Burkina Faso the public sector is the main entry to formal 
sector employment. The public sector provides jobs far more than the structured private sector. Entry to 
the public sector is subject to the successful completion of national exams depending on their level of 
education. With scarce job openings it is common for postgraduate to sit for exams requiring an 
undergraduate or secondary school diploma. Thus in the public sector it is usual to see high educated 
individuals working at positions requiring less education.  
 
Besides education, gender has a significant and negative impact on earnings at 5%.  Results suggest that 
women are discriminated against in the formal sector. Household size is a positive and significant (at 
10%), and thus appears as a determinant of wage employment in the formal sector. Formal sector wage 
earners living in urban areas are likely to earn more than the ones living in rural areas. 
 
We use the 3 estimated earnings equations above to predict the expected incomes of each paid workers in 
each occupational category. Then these expected incomes are used as explanatory variables in the nested 
logit.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 The findings may suffer from some bias due to the negligible number of women in the sub-ample of informal wage 
employment (only 0.4%) 
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B- Level 1 : the determinants of informal self-employment 
 
As it summarized in Table 5 in Appendix the main determinant of self-employment is education. In fact 
the higher education and primary school education variables are significant at 5% whereas the secondary 
school education is significant at 1%. All the coefficients for education levels are negative. Thus, the 
probability of self-employment (relative to wage employment) in the informal sector decreases with the 
level of education. For instance being high educated reduces by 5.73% the probability to be self-employed 
whereas the secondary level decreases it by 7.18% (see Table 9 in Appendix). This result differs slightly 
from Rankin and al (2010) where a multinomial logit is used to show that the probability of either self-
employment or employment in a small firm (in the informal sector) decreases with education. However, 
these authors do not compare between the two types of employment in the informal sector, thus the 
value-added of a nested logit. In fact, the first level of our model allows us to show that in the informal 
sector the level of education increases the probability of wage employment. 
 
Concerning the gender, the men are less likely to be self-employed than women. In fact, being a man 
reduces by 11.68% the probability to work in self-employment category. So we confirm results obtained 
by Do and Duchene (2008) in the case of Vietnam and Kabubo-Mariara (2003) in the case of Kenya. 
Despite the weakness of the expected earnings the women are constrained to work in the informal sector 
as self-employed. 
 
Concerning the household’s age all age brackets are not significant. Regarding family background, while 
the size of the household is not significant, married individuals are more likely to be self-employed 
compared to single people. The place of residence is also a relevant for informal self-employment. In fact 
living in urban area reduces the probability of self-employment relatively to rural area where small 
activities of trade, manufacturing, repairing are increasingly used to cope with the uncertainty of farming 
and to diversify income sources.  
 
With regard to the branch of activities, being in non-tradable services and industries increases the 
likelihood of self-employment. Likewise, access to credit enhances the probability to be self-employed as 
opposed to informal wage employment. In fact undertaking a business requires a minimum of capital. 
Access to credit may surely stimulate entrepreneurship. Also, while access to drinking water reduces the 
probability to be self-employed, access to electricity is not significant. Finally, individuals who are entitled 
to paid leave are more likely to be wage workers than self-employers17. 
 
In order to highlight the effect of expected earnings relative to self-employment (by minimizing the risk of 
colinearity) we compute again the first level of the nested logit after having replaced the education 
                                                          
17
This result may not be useful since self-employers basically pay themselves, and so cannot claim paid leaves. 
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dummies by the cross education and these expected earnings. Table 9 (in Appendix) shows that the 
expected earnings associated to each level of education reduce significantly the probability to be self-
employed. For instance, earnings expected by the high educated reduces this probability by 0.03% whereas 
the earnings associated to secondary level reduce it by 0.05%. So regardless to the level of education self-
employment does not provide attractive expected incomes. 
 
C- Level 2: The determinants of formal employment as opposed to informal employment 
 
As shown in Table6 (Appendix) the level of education increases the probability of employment in the 
formal sector. The higher education and secondary school variables are significant at 1% whereas the 
primary school variable is significant at 5%. Indeed, high education attainment reduces by 47.95% the 
probability to work in the informal sector where as the secondary level decreases it by 34.51% (Table 9 in 
Appendix). The probability to work in the informal sector is also reduced by only 8% when moving from 
no education to the primary level. These results lend support to our theoretical finding from Section 2. 
Kuepie et al, (2009), Rankin and al (2010), and NguetseTegoum (2009) find similar results. 
Contrary to place of residence, age bracket 25-34, marital status, household’s size and, gender are 
significant. In fact, individuals between 25 and 34 years old are less likely to work in the formal sector than 
those in the range of 45-64 years old. This can be explained by the low education attainment of the young. 
Likewise men are more likely to work in the formal sector than women. This result may also find his 
explanation to the weakness education attainment of women as opposed to men. Even if the national 
competition to enter the public sector is indifferently opened to both men and women, there are fewer 
women, who meet the minimum qualification requirements. 
 
Regarding the branch of activities only ``tradable services’’ (trade, repairing) significantly reduce the 
probability to work in the formal sector. While firms involved in international trade are required to be 
registered in order to do their business, the one devoted to the domestic trade can escape to this 
requirement. And yet as the 1-2-3 survey has shown the informal units are domestic market-oriented. 
They generally subcontract with the international traders to insure the retail inside the country. But the 
retailers are subject to commercial card different from the fiscal identification number. Then retailers with 
commercial card are considered are informal according to the definition of informal sector used in this 
paper. The variables measuring the access to public services and credit have no impact on the propensity 
to work in the formal sector whereas the variables relative to social protection are significant at 1%. In 
fact, individuals who benefit from old-age pension and/or are entitled to paid leave are less likely to work 
in the informal sector.  
 
Finally the cross expected earnings-education effect on the probability to work in the formal sector is 
positive and significant regardless the level of education (see Table 8 in Appendix). Indeed the formal 
expected earnings associated to the high education attainment increase by 15.69% the probability to work 
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in this sector whereas the secondary level of education enhances it by 16.21% (see Table 9 in Appendix). 
But the earnings expected by individuals with primary school level in the formal sector increase only by 
0.05% the probability to work in this sector. These finding demonstrate that formal sector gives more 
value to education. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main goal of this paper was to revisit the factors that select individuals into the informal sector of the 
economy in Burkina while investigating the drivers of occupational choice between self-employment and 
wage employment. The paper first developed a theoretical framework to shed light on the potential role of 
education in agents’ decision-making process. Ranking occupational options from low-paid and precarious 
to high-paid with benefit, we find that the more educated an individual, the higher the occupational 
category which he aims to. We then take this prediction to the data, using annual households’ standards of 
living survey 2007 for Burkina Faso. Empirical results provide evidence for educated preference for wage 
employment (whether in the formal or in the informal sector). They also confirm significant gender 
imbalances as women are less likely than men to get a job (whether in the formal or in the informal 
sector). Empirical findings also show the important role of individual characteristics like family 
background and urban / rural residential status as well as institutional factors, including access to credit, to 
public infrastructures, safe water and electricity. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of independant variables  
Independant Variables  Formal wage 
employment 
Informal wage 
employment 
Self-employment 
Intrinsic and familial 
Man 
Woman 
Mean Age  
Mean household size 
Single 
Married 
 
91.5% 
8.5% 
38.81% 
4.37% 
17.8% 
82.3% 
 
99.6% 
0.4% 
36.16 
3.81 
25.3 % 
74.7 % 
 
81.4% 
18.6% 
38.53 
4.77 
12.5% 
87.5% 
Education 
No education 
1-6 years of schooling 
7-14 years of schooling 
+14 years of schooling 
 
7% 
8.2% 
61.2% 
23.6% 
 
35.1 % 
23.4 % 
34.4 % 
7.2 % 
 
66.3 % 
20.5 % 
11.4 % 
1.8 % 
Place of residence 
Urban 
Rural 
 
79.3 % 
20.7 % 
 
88.7 % 
11.3 % 
 
54.2 % 
45.8 % 
Branchs 
Industries 
Tradable Services 
Non-tradable Services 
Financial services 
 
7.5 % 
8.2 % 
76.4 % 
7.8 % 
 
29.4 % 
40.4 % 
21.1 % 
9.1 % 
 
30.4 % 
57.1 % 
8.6 % 
3.9 % 
Access to public services  
Fixed phone line (yes) 
Access to electricity 
Access to drinking water 
 
20.1 % 
77.4 % 
81.9 % 
 
6.8 % 
53.2 % 
84.2 % 
 
3.7 % 
31.3 % 
53.6 % 
Access to financial services  
Applied for a credit (yes) 
Positive answer 
 
 
41 % 
39.7 % 
 
 
7.5 % 
7.2 % 
 
 
13 % 
10.6 % 
Social Protection 
Old-age pension (yes) 
Paid leave 
 
91% 
93.9 % 
 
7.5 % 
19.2% 
 
2.3 % 
2.3 % 
Source: computed by the author from the Annual Survey on the household standard of living conditions/ 
2007 database  
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Table 2: Earnings equation with Lee’s correction term in informal self-employment 
Significant at: *** 1%;** 5%;* 10%. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications 
 
 
  
Log (earnings) Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
Age 0.0201573 1.46 
Age2 -0.0002263 -1.36 
Gender 0.1149578 2.11** 
Marital status -0.0997227 -1.27 
Household size 0.0726237 8.19*** 
Education 
1-6 years of schooling 0.1315545 2.79*** 
7-14 years of schooling 0.3848081 2.69*** 
+14 years of schooling 0.9918264 3.34*** 
Place of residence 0.4490648 -1.27*** 
         -0.0813299 -0.48 
constant 9.230063 30.83*** 
Number of obs = 1505  
Wald chi2(10) = 291.03  
Prob> chi2 =0.0000  
R-squared = 0.1570 
Adj R-squared = 0.1514 
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Table 3: Earnings equation with Lee’s correction term in informal wage employment 
Significant at: *** 1%;** 5%;* 10%. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications 
 
  
Log (earnings) Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
Age -.0126741 -0.38 
Age2 0.0002804 0.68 
Gender 1.905854 1.94* 
Marital status 0.2023358 1.63 
Household size 0.014026 0.53 
Education 
1-6 years of schooling 0.085138 0.84 
7-14 years of schooling 0.3951843 4.38*** 
+14 years of schooling 0.7601822 3.78*** 
Place of residence 0.7141545 2.63*** 
         2 .5474412 1.81* 
Constant 6.653549 4.37*** 
Number of obs = 265  
Wald chi2(10) = 291.03  
Prob> chi2 =0.0000  
R-squared = 0.1570 
Adj R-squared = 0.1514 
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Table 4: Earnings equation with Lee’s correction term in formal wage employment 
Significant at: *** 1%;** 5%;* 10%. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications 
 
  
Log (earnings) Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
Age -0.0197704 -0.72 
Age2 0.0002835 0.85 
Gender -0.1995532 -2.12** 
Marital status -0.0715734 -0.84 
Household size 0.0287195 1.87* 
Education 
1-6 years of schooling -0.5503897 -2.37** 
7-14 years of schooling -1.045977 -3.35*** 
+14 years of schooling -0.1995532 -2.12** 
Place of residence 0.1479463 1.97** 
         -0.8921949 -5.59*** 
constant 12.91301 15.91*** 
Number of obs = 743  
Wald chi2(10) = 198.70  
Prob> chi2 =0.0000  
R-squared = 0.1968 
Adj R-squared = 0.1859 
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Table 5: The determinants of self-employment (compared to informal wage employment) 
 
Self-employment Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
15-24 yearsold 0.0075017 0.02 
25-34yearsold -0.1105696 -0.47 
35-44 yearsold -0.0596904 -0.27 
45-64 yearsold (ref)   
Gender -4.522155 -4.23*** 
Marital status 0.77483 3.48*** 
Household size 0.0305217 0.84 
Education 
No education (ref)   
1-6 years of schooling -0.3813448 -1.86* 
7-14 years of schooling -0.9259177 -4.36*** 
+14 years of schooling -0.7310485 -2.10** 
Place of residence -1.314027 -4.10*** 
Branchs of activities 
Industries -4.10 2.30** 
Tradable Services 1.237836 4.15*** 
Non- tradable Services 0.2941083 0.85 
Financial services (ref)   
Access to credit 0.8456315 2.49** 
Access to public  services 
Fixed phone line 0.0813634 0.24 
Access to electricity 0.2349714 1.30 
Access to drinking water -0.5010378 -1.71* 
Social protection 
Old-age pension  -0.6012056 -1.34 
Paid leave -1.931864 -6.90*** 
Constant 
 
 
6.112622 5.34*** 
Number of obs = 1770 
Wald chi2(19) =239.80 
Prob> chi2 =0.0000 
Pseudo R2 =0.2682 
Log pseudo likelihood = -546.87291 
 
 
 
*** 1%;** 5%;* 10%.  
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Table 6: The determinants of self-employment (compared to informal wage employment). The 
cross effect of earnings and education 
 
Self-employment Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
15-24 years old 0.0066268 0.02 
25-34years old -0.1102132 -0.47 
35-44 years old -0.0580791 -0.27 
45-64 years old (ref)   
Gender -4.52077 -4.23*** 
Marital status 0.7744339 3.48*** 
Household size 0.0329466 0.90 
Education 
No education (ref)   
       -0.035634 -1.81* 
      -0.086631 -4.34*** 
      -0.0642332 -2.07** 
Place of residence -1.305182 -4.06*** 
Branchs of activities 
Industries 0.7133952 2.29** 
Tradable Services 1.237418 4.14*** 
Non- tradable Services 0.2930967 0.85 
Financial services (ref)   
Access to credit 0.8441839 2.48** 
Access to public  services 
Fixed phone line 0.079735 0.23 
Access to electricity 0.2333202 1.29 
Access to drinking water -0.5017851 -1.71* 
Social protection 
Old-age pension  -0.6013111 -1.34 
Paid leave -1.930875 -6.90*** 
Constant 
 
 
6.091446 5.33*** 
Number of obs = 1770 
Wald chi2(19) =240.08 
Prob> chi2 =0.0000 
Pseudo R2 =0.2681 
Log pseudo likelihood = -546.95086 
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Table 7: The determinants of formal sector compared to informal sector 
Job Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
15-24 years old -0.3950061 -0.56 
25-34 years old -0.8804565 -2.27** 
35-44 years old -0.5465154 -1.49 
45-64 years old (ref)   
Gender 2.820918 1.76* 
Marital status -0.6633913 -1.78* 
Household size 0.1196081 2.57** 
Education 
No education (ref)   
1-6 years of schooling 1.039589 2.46** 
7-14 years of schooling 3.112254 7.94*** 
+14 years of schooling 3.130433 6.16*** 
Place of residence 0.1210718 0.25 
Branchs of activities 
Industries -0.7271668 -1.38 
Tradable Services -1.135806 -2.17** 
Non- tradable Services 0.7501837 1.57 
Financial services (ref)   
Access to credit -0.2577847 -0.77 
Access to public  services 
Fixed phone line -0.2212572 -0.55 
Access to electricity 1.132036 3.40*** 
Access to drinking water -0.1324575 -0.31 
Social protection 
Old-age pension 3.877862 8.89*** 
Paid leave 2.905785 7.07*** 
IVformal_sector 0.7150867 1.99** 
IVinformal_sector 0.2071439 0.72 
Constant 
 
 
-8.410456 -3.55*** 
Number of obs = 2513 
Wald chi2(21) =647.89 
Prob> chi2 =0.0000 
Pseudo R2 =0.8274 
Log pseudo likelihood = -263.3733 
*** 1%;** 5%;* 10%. 
IVformal_sector:inclusive value of the degenerated nest formal sector 
IVinformal_sector: inclusive value of the nest informal sector 
The both inclusive values are in the interval [0-1]  which reinforces the consistency of the nested logit. 
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Table 8: The determinants of formal sector compared to informal sector. The cross effect of 
earnings and education 
 
Job Coef z 
 
Individual and familial characteristics 
15-24 years old -0.2816919 -0.40 
25-34 years old -0.8476615 -2.19** 
35-44 years old -0.5301698 -1.45 
45-64 years old (ref)   
Gender 2.906264 1.82* 
Marital status -0.6886988 -1.84* 
Household size 0.1141519 2.41** 
Education 
No education (ref)   
       0.097601 2.45** 
      0.2858879 8.00*** 
      0.2767164 6.20*** 
Place of residence 0.1619622 0.34 
Branchs of activities 
Industries -0.7238285 -1.37 
Tradable Services -1.136047 -2.16** 
Non- tradable Services 0.7524047 1.57 
Financial services (ref)   
Access to credit -0.2593175 -0.77 
Access to public  services 
Fixed phone line -0.2488794 -0.62 
Access to electricity 1.061853 3.18*** 
Access to drinking water -0.121266 -0.28 
Social protection 
Old-age pension 3.888026 8.91*** 
Paid leave 2.914325 7.07*** 
IVformal_sector 0.728164 2.03 
IVinformal_sector 0.2236562 0.78 
Constant 
 
 
-8.498611 -3.59*** 
Number of obs = 2513 
Wald chi2(21) =649.14 
Prob> chi2 =0.0000 
Pseudo R2 =0.8275 
Log pseudo likelihood = -263.12171 
Significant at:*** 1%;** 5%;* 10%. 
IVformal_sector:inclusive value of the degenerated nest formal sector 
IVinformal_sector: inclusive value of the nest informal sector 
The both inclusive values are in the interval [0-1]  which reinforces the consistency of the nested logit  
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Table 9: Marginal effect of relevant variables on the probability to be self-employed 
 
Self-employment dy/dx  
 
Gender -0.1168021  
Marital status 0.0573744  
1-6 years of schooling -0.0242968  
7-14 years of schooling -0.0718646  
+14 years of schooling -0.0573309  
       -0.0020558  
      -0.0049978  
      -0.0037057  
Place of residence -0.0713025  
Industries 0.0368384  
Tradable Services 0.0779689  
Acces to credit 0.0368202  
Access to drinking water -0.0280244  
Paid leave -0.2351149  
 
 
Table 10: Marginal effect of relevant variables on the probability to work in formal sector  
Self-employment dy/dx  
 
Gender 0.0802439  
Marital status -0.0460994  
Household size 0.0067422  
1-6 years of schooling 0.0804775  
7-14 years of schooling 0.3451762  
+14 years of schooling 0.4795211  
       0.005536  
      0.0162157  
      0.0156954  
Industries -0.0350838  
Tradable Services -0.0605631  
Access to electricity 0.0678562  
Old-age pension 0.4791918  
Paid leave 0.2950685  
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Table 11: Hausman test on IIA assumption 
 (b) 
M2 
(B) 
M1 
(b-B) 
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
SE 15-24 years old 
 
.4322383      2.111767 .4716627 -.0394244 .111767 
25-34 years old 
 
1.776191 .8152304 .9609607 .8372462 
35-44 years old 
 
1.331011      .6831695 .6109859 .7200247 .6831695 
Gender 
 
1.262434 2.685301 -1.422867 2.941679 
Marital status 
 
-.8276009 -1.322147 .4945459 .9314985 
Household size -.073851 .045981 -.1198319 .1112347 
1-6 years of 
schooling 
-.3814543 .5806767 -.962131 .7199598 
7-14 years of 
schooling 
-2.373336 .8164566 -3.189793 .5717697 
+14 years of 
schooling 
-2.363074 .8467596 -3.209833 .9580352 
Residence 1.299506 1.615039 -.3155334 1.976996 
Credit -3.116049 -1.868684 -1.247365 2.876012 
Industries .1338596 -.6783548 .8122144 .4524685 
Tradable Services .2373467 -1.160489 1.397836 .4288987 
Non- tradable 
Services 
-1.007268 -.2807054 -.7265631 .3516044 
Fixed phone line .131557 -.0427554 .1743124 .3792311 
Access to 
electricity 
-2.012692 -.4823039 -1.530388 1.329217 
Access to drinking 
water 
-2.012692 -.4823039 -1.530388 1.329217 
Old-age pension -3.733368 -.3473322 -3.386036 -3.246336 
Paid leave -1.313388             .2505696 2.091549 -3.404937 .2505696 
Constant 1.360499 -5.012287 6.372787 5.321032 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2 (21) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=      177.10 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Lee’s model 
 
Consider the following model: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
  
        where                                                                                                           (2) 
 
 is a categorical variable that describes the choice of an economic agent among  alternatives based on 
utilities   
   
The outcome variable   is observed if and only if category s is chosen which happens: 
 
  
           
                                                                                                                                  (3) 
 
Define: 
 
      
   
   
    
      
   
                                                                                      (4) 
 
Then under this definition, condition (3) is equivalent to      
 
The problem is to estimate the parameter vector   while taking into account that the disturbance term    
may not be independent of all   .This would introduce some correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the disturbance term in the outcome equation of model (1).Because of this, least squares 
estimates of   would not be consistent. 
Define                  then 
 
                                                                                                                     (5) 
 
Given that the relation between the   components of   and the   corresponding probabilities is 
invertible, there is a unique function   that can be substituted for    
 
Therefore, consistent estimation of   can be based on the following regression: 
 
                                                                                                                           (6) 
 
Where  is a residual that is mean-independent of the regressors 
 
In a widely quoted paper, Lee (1983) proposed a generalization of the two-step selection bias correction 
method introduced by Heckman (1979) that allows for any parameterized error distribution. His method 
extends to the case where selectivity is modelled as a multinomial logit. This approach is simple and 
requires the estimation of only one parameter in the correction term. This is, however, achieved at the 
cost of fairly restrictive assumptions. 
 
Call     
      the cumulative distribution of   . .The cumulative     
     . Defined by the following 
transform    
              
       where   the standard normal is cumulative, has a standard normal 
distribution. Lee’s model can be written as implying that: 
 
                    
       and yields an estimating equation of the form: 
 
           
      
      
    
     
                                                                                  (7) 
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